A model of the shareholder constraint is described in terms of the relationship between shareholding concentration and corporate control.
This paper develops a model of nonprofit firm behavior which links nonprofit market structure, firm-specific characteristics and firm performance.
This paper explains the fact that firms market both labeled and unlabeled products as a practice of price discrimination that emerges as a noncooperative equilibrium outcome.
This paper presents a model of product proliferation by multiproduct firms.
Prospects are discussed for regulating a multiproduct, monopolistic enterprise through a tax on profit at a rate variable with output.
A survey of 4378 significant innovations shows that firms with fewer than 1000 employees commercialised a much larger share than is indicated by their share of R & D expenditures.
Wachtel and Adelsheim (WA) and Cowling have argued that firms in concentrated industries tend to increase their price mark-ups in recession.
This paper employs a simple-game-theoretic perspective to analyse the relationship between shareholding concentration and the voting power of leading coalitions among the top 200 non-financial corpora
This paper examines how uncertainty in future operating costs at the time of undertaking long-lived and irreversible capital investment projects may provide an incentive for multinational production.
A monopolized market can be more conducive to invention than a competitive market in contrast to Arrow's assertion of the opposite.