Issue 3

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September 1992
Articles: 

On the Welfare Effects of Regulating Price Discrimination

In a model with linear demands and constant variable costs, it is shown that a welfare gain is made by restricting the relative rather than absolute prices that a monopolist can charge for a range of

Basing Point Pricing: Competition Versus Collusion

We consider the implications of game-theoretic models for the competitive or collusive nature of basing point pricing (BPP).

Multiproduct Firms: A Nested Logit Approach

The paper proves the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with multiproduct firms using a nested logit model of demand.

Regulation with "20-20 Hindsight": Least-Cost Rules and Variable Costs

Regulators sometimes review a regulated firm's input decisions in retrospect (i.e. with "20-20 hindsight") and punish bad outcomes rather than bad decisions.

Profit Sharing in the British Retail Trade Sector: The Relative Performance of the John Lewis Partnership

This paper investigates the effects of profit-sharing on wages and employment by comparing the labour market behaviour of the John Lewis Partnership with that of four main competitors.

Telephone Demand over the Atlantic: Evidence from Country-Pair DataTelephone Demand over the Atlantic: Evidence from Country-Pair Data

International calls include consumption and financial externalities.

The Output and Profit Effects of Horizontal Joint Ventures

The effects of production joint ventures on their parents' profits and total industry output are analyzed.

How Anti-Merger Laws can Reduce Investment, Help Producers, and Hurt Consumers

If capital lowers marginal cost and a firm with more capital gets a bigger share of the surplus in merger bargaining, then the equilibrium price with a merger may be lower than without a merger.