This short essay introduces a special issue of The Journal of Industrial Economics on vertical relationships, including both vertical integration and vertical restraints.
This paper tests models of vertical integration, with emphasis on incentives that arise from transactions costs and demand variability.
This paper tests four propositions regarding the efficiency of vertical arrangements.
In this article the concept of multiproduct cost economies is modified to the case of production at vertically related stages to derive an explicit and general measure of economies of vertical integra
When a firm contracts with a privately informed retailer, vertical restraints may be insufficient to eliminate distortions arising from having to induce truthful reporting.
Two manufacturers distribute their brands through exclusive retail dealers, and must compete for consumers indirectly by inducing retailers to carry their brands.
When a two-product monopolist merges with one of its suppliers, thus eliminating the double marginalization for one of its goods, three qualitative effects on downstream prices can result.
This paper examines the implications of a retailer's shelf space stocking decisions on the optimal marketing strategy of an upstream multi-product monopolist.
Current theories of the vertical limits to firm size emphasise the consequences of opportunistic behaviour by managers.
This paper analyzes the role of ex post producer opportunism on the optimal design of vertical restraints. It considers vertical contracts as starting points of ex post renegotiation.