This paper studies firms' incentives to disclose horizontal product attributes in a competitive environment.
The model incorporates an infinite series of auctions for identical items (or close substitutes) ordered over time and bidders with unit demand.
A primary explanation for variation in contract structure is the extent to which contracting parties make investments specific to their transaction.
We use Monte Carlo experiments to study how pass-through can improve merger price predictions, focusing on the first order approximation (FOA) proposed in Jaffe and Weyl .
We propose a dynamic model of an oligopoly industry characterized by spatial competition between multi-store retailers.
While file sharing has undermined firms’ ability to generate revenue for their products, other technological change has reduced entry barriers in cultural industries, with substantial positive impacts
We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it can be employed as the seller's optimal strategy.
We analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by risk-averse cartels that care about the utility derived from profits.
We introduce asymmetric product differentiation in a model characterized by a linear demand system, endogenous markups and heterogeneous firms (as in Melitz-Ottaviano ).
The paper presents a new framework to assess firm level heterogeneity and to study the rate and direction of technical change.