Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation.
We analyze incidence and evolution of patent thickets.
We consider an incomplete contracting model of bilateral trade in intellectual property (IP) with sequential investments in its quality and with financial constraints.
We examine the role of patents as signals used to reduce information asymmetries in entrepreneurial finance.
We model patent-signaling by informed venture capitalists to incumbent acquirers of developed innovations.
I present a model in which firms differing in R&D productivity choose between ambitious research projects, which are socially desirable, and unambitious ones, which are socially undesirable.
The paper offers a novel justification for the non-obviousness patentability requirement.
This paper investigates how the implementation of intellectual property rights in developing countries under the 1995 TRIPS agreement affected trade in knowledge-intensive goods.
This paper exploits the selection of prize-winning technologies among exhibitors at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851 to examine whether—and how—ex post prizes that are awarded to high-quality inn
Under a 2007 U.S. law, the developer of a treatment for a neglected disease is rewarded with a fast-track voucher that can be sold to another developer.
The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to exploit patents on their federally sponsored research.