Issue 3

September 2001
Articles: 

Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry

Revenue sharing contracts, in which retailers pay a royalty on sales to their suppliers, are now widely used in the video rental industry.

Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies

In a housing insurance market buildings have different damage probabilities. High-risk houses need investment, low-risk houses don’t. Insurers use imperfect tests to assess risks.

Adoption of a Process Innovation with Learning-by-Doing: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry

This article analyzes the adoption of a new process technology in the global semiconductor manufacturing industry.

Technological Incompatibility, Endogenous Switching Costs and Lock-in

Systems are goods comprising of durables that are sequentially updated with complements.

Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?

The merger of AOL and Time Warner involved a vertical combination of the largest Internet content provider and aggregator and a large cable system operator which offers a conduit through which broadba

Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage

We consider the incentive of a dominant firm that supplies a necessary input to a Bertrand-competitive differentiated products downstream industry to: (1) vertically integrate forward, and (2) raise i

International Telecom Settlements: Gaming Incentives, Carrier Alliances and Pareto-Superior Reform

Liberalized countries that allow competition in international telecommunications favor traffic re-routing practices as arbitrage against foreign monopolists. This view is seriously incomplete.

The Role of Incentives for Opening Monopoly Markets: Comparing GTE and BOC Cooperation with Local Entrants

While the 1996 Telecommunications Act requires all incumbent local telephone companies to cooperate with local entrants, section 271 of the Act provides the Bell companies but not GTE additional incen