Generalizing Location Games to a Graph

Warning: is_dir(): open_basedir restriction in effect. File(/libraries) is not within the allowed path(s): (/home/web1050:/usr/share/php) in libraries_get_libraries() (line 176 of /home/web1050/public_html/sites/all/modules/contrib/libraries/libraries.module).

http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2098670

Authors:

Vicki Knoblauch

We study two-firm location games on graphs. Earlier work analyzes two-firm location games on a line or a circle, and all examples given possess pure Nash equilibria. We produce an example of a graph with no pure Nash equilibria and also a general class of graphs that do possess pure Nash equilibria.

Pages:

683-688

Times downloaded:

Generalizing Location Games to a Graph

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint

Corporate Leniency Programs when Firms have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption

A Structural Approach to Market Definition with an Application to the Hospital Industry

Published with