Issue 4

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December 2010
Articles: 

INTRODUCTION TO THE MINI-SYMPOSIUM ON NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH ON MERGER POLICY DESIGN

In recent years there has been a marked increase in interest in the empirical evaluation of competition policy generally and merger policy more specifically.

HORIZONTAL MERGERS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONSUMER WELFARE IN A COURNOT OLIGOPOLY WITH ASSETS

Competition authorities sometimes require that firms divest some of their assets to rivals in order to allow a merger to take place.

EFFICIENCY GAINS AND STRUCTURAL REMEDIES IN MERGER CONTROL

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust

THE PRICE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING POTENTIAL COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM AN AIRLINE MERGER

This paper analyzes the gain in pricing power that a firm achieves by merging with a potential competitor in its market.

SCREENING AND MERGER ACTIVITY

In our paper, the target of a proposed merger, by setting a reserve price, is able to screen prospective acquirers according to their (expected) ability to generate merger-specific synergies.

MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICING STRATEGY OF CHINA'S AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY

In this study, using market-level data on quantities, prices' and automobile characteristics from 1995 to 2001, we conduct a market analysis of the Chinese automobile industry under imperfect competit

INPUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION WHEN BUYERS OPERATE IN MULTIPLE MARKETS

This paper revisits third-degree price discrimination when input buyers serve multiple product markets.

NETWORK SECURITY: VULNERABILITIES AND DISCLOSURE POLICY

Software security is a major concern for vendors, consumers and regulators. When vulnerabilities are discovered after the software has been sold to consumers, the firms face a dilemma.

MEASURING THE TRUE HARM FROM PRICE-FIXING TO BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT PURCHASERS

Legal actions by direct and indirect purchasers to recover damages from price-fixing, common in the United States for years, are now appearing in a number of other countries.

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS

Dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of RPM.