Issue 3

September 2005
Articles: 

USING RESERVE PRICES TO DETER COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT COMPETITION

To enhance our understanding of collusion in procurement settings, this paper quantitatively evaluates how the buyer's choice of a reserve price influences the sustainability of two previously devised

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS

Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption.

ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COMPETITIVE RESEARCH SHARING JOINT VENTURES

Research sharing is an important objective of many research joint ventures.

DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex-ante the firms that compete ex-post on the product market.

STRATEGIC DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATEGIC EMULATION IN GAMES WITH UNCERTAINTY

When players who choose a common strategy face a common shock, while players who choose different strategies face independent or imperfectly correlated shocks, equilibrium choices exhibit differentiat