The Competition and Regulation European Summer School and Conference (CRESSE) is an informal network of academics and professionals with an interest in competition policy and sectoral regulation.
We study the effect of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law. We develop a model of litigation and settlement with asymmetric information.
We present a new welfare-based framework for optimally choosing legal standards (decision rules).
The purpose of this article is to investigate the optimal merger policy in the presence of deterrence as of well as of type I and type II errors.
We develop a general framework for computing cartel damages claims.
In this paper, we revisit the issue of licensing ‘weak’ patents under the shadow of litigation.
Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSO's).
ATM fees have been a source of controversyin many countries.
If consumers value ‘mix and match’ combinations of network complements, incompatibility between different sellers' components should affect prices.
We compare the effects on welfare of the three most common regimes for pricing shared ATM transactions: (i) free usage, (ii) foreign fees, and (iii) foreign fees and surcharges.
This paper analyzes the effects of ATM surcharges on deployment and welfare, in a model where banks compete for ATM and banking services.