Issue 2

June 2008
Articles: 

OPTIMAL CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS

This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs.

STRATEGIC VERTICAL INTEGRATION WITHOUT FORECLOSURE

We determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model of successive oligopoly that captures both efficiency gains and strategic effects. Foreclosure effects are purposely left aside.

MARKET MAKING OLIGOPOLY

This paper analyzes price competition between market makers who set costly capacity constraints before they intermediate between producers and consumers.

THE EFFECT OF AUCTION FORMAT ON EFFICIENCY AND REVENUE IN DIVISIBLE GOODS AUCTIONS: A TEST USING KOREAN TREASURY AUCTIONS

This paper measures the efficiency and revenue properties of the two most popular formats for divisible goods auctions: the uniform-price and discriminatory auction.

PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN OLIGOPOLY: EVIDENCE FROM REGIONAL NEWSPAPERS

Recent theoretical work has shown that the incentive to target rival firms' customers with low prices can increase price discrimination, and that the strength of the incentive depends on a firm's mark

INEFFICIENCIES AND MARKET POWER IN FINANCIAL ARBITRAGE: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY MARKETS

For two years prior to the collapse of California's restructured electricity market, power traded in both a forward and a spot market for delivery at the same times and locations.

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: ON THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS

The impact on vertical contracting of a type-dependent reservation utility is investigated within a sequential monopolies environment with asymmetric information.

THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF COUPON REMEDIES FOR PRICE OVERCHARGES

Consumers injured by price overcharges often are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been e

Notes: 

THE MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF THE TELEVISON NEWS SCHEDULING GAME

Jean J.Gabszewicz
Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton

No abstract is available for this article