This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs.
We determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model of successive oligopoly that captures both efficiency gains and strategic effects. Foreclosure effects are purposely left aside.
This paper analyzes price competition between market makers who set costly capacity constraints before they intermediate between producers and consumers.
This paper measures the efficiency and revenue properties of the two most popular formats for divisible goods auctions: the uniform-price and discriminatory auction.
Recent theoretical work has shown that the incentive to target rival firms' customers with low prices can increase price discrimination, and that the strength of the incentive depends on a firm's mark
For two years prior to the collapse of California's restructured electricity market, power traded in both a forward and a spot market for delivery at the same times and locations.
The impact on vertical contracting of a type-dependent reservation utility is investigated within a sequential monopolies environment with asymmetric information.
Consumers injured by price overcharges often are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been e
No abstract is available for this article