Issue 2

June 2012

Using Revenue Sharing to Implement Flexible Prices: Evidence from Movie Exhibition Contracts

Movie exhibition contracts entail revenue-sharing terms that go down with weeks since release.

Career Concerns, Inaction and Market Inefficiency: Evidence From Utility Regulation

We study how incentive conflicts known as ‘career concerns’ can generate inefficiencies not only within firms but also in market outcomes.

Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation

Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold-up problem.

Resale and Collusion in A Dynamic Market for Semidurable Goods

The paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second-hand markets.

Oust the Louse: Does Political Pressure Discipline Regulators?

Remaining in office is a potential motivator for regulatory decisions by public utility commissioners. We examine regulatory exit, where a regulator leaves a U.S.

Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Consumer Surplus

This paper considers the effects of monopoly third-degree price discrimination on aggregate consumer surplus.